This paper examines the long-term effects of job displacement, due to establishment closures in Sweden, on labour market status. Linked employer-employee data made it possible to identify all workers displaced in 1987 and to follow them until 1999. Using a difference-indifference matching estimator, we found a rapid recovery after the displacement in 1987, with respect to both employment and unemployment, and by 1990 the adverse effects of the displacement had almost vanished. This recovery was, however, arrested and even reversed by the deep recession in 1990, and by the end of the century the echo of the job loss 13 years earlier had still not subsided. We attribute the longer-term effects to recurrent displacements. Among the various possible explanations of this phenomenon, we focus on short tenure on subsequent jobs, which makes the previously displaced vulnerable to further adverse shocks. However, we cannot precisely identify the significance of short tenure for recurrent displacement, but loss of job specific capital or seniority layoff rules are the prime candidates.
Introduction
The costs of job displacement have been defined by Hamermesh (1987) as the sum of adjustment costs incurred while the labour market moves to a new equilibrium and the difference between the value of resources before and after the labour market has adjusted to the shock that changes its value. It would appear quite reasonable that there are adjustment costs and indeed there is a substantial body of empirical research in the United States (e.g., Farber, 2003) and Europe (e.g., Kuhn, 2002) that confirm this as regards earnings and joblessness.
1 However, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, research has even found significant long-term effects on earnings. See Ruhm (1991) , Jacobsen et al. (1993) and Stevens (1997) for the United States. While the long-term evidence from Europe is sparser, Huttunen et al. (2003) found negative earnings effects, in Norway, up to six years after displacement.
The short-term consequences of displacement are usually attributed to loss of firm specific capital (Hamermesh, 1987) . The literature is much less explicit concerning the mechanisms behind the longer-term effects. The unemployment scarring literature (e.g., Ellwood, 1982 , Arulampalam et al., 2001 and Böheim and Taylor, 2002 refers to a number of factors such as permanent loss of firm-specific human capital, the deterioration of general human capital during a spell of unemployment, and that potential employers may use previous labour market history as a signal of productivity, but are not able to discriminate between the many hypothesis. However, Stevens (1997) showed that the long-term earnings effects were, to a considerable extent, related to multiple job losses. This leads us to focus on post-displacement labour market status. The risk of subsequent job loss is of course extremely sensitive to the state of the labour market (Hall, 1995) . Unlike previous literature on long-term effects of displacement, we control fully for the state of the labour market by exposing the displaced and control group of non-displaced workers to the same labour market Using linked (administrative) employer-employee data we examined the postdisplacement labour market status, over a period of 13 years, of all workers who lost their job in 1987 due to the closure of an establishment in Sweden, compared to a matched control group.
2 Administrative data can overcome some of the weaknesses of survey data such as recall bias, small sample size and, of particular importance when studying long-term effects, sample attrition (Jacobson et al., 1993) . However, a weakness of administrative data is that one typically observes not displacements but separations. Our exclusive focus on displacement due to plant closures is useful in this respect. Moreover, we have information on the closure process up to three years before final closure which Hamermesh and Pfann (2003) shows to be critical when properly evaluating the consequences of displacement.
Recent research on worker displacement has typically followed the fixed effects approach as applied in Jacobson et al. (1993) who pointed out that the approach draws upon the (labour market program) evaluation literature. In this paper, however, we instead used propensity score matching, a method originating in the field of medical statistics Rubin, 1983, 1984) , which has recently been applied to evaluation research in Economics and is particularly suitable in this application.
3 Our focus on plant closures and the availability of very rich pre-displacement information on individual, sector, establishment and regional characteristics, and pre-displacement labour market and health status permits us with some degree of confidence to consider that the conditional independence assumption, underpinning propensity score matching, is plausible.
The next section begins by briefly describing the changes in the macroeconomic environment during the long 13-year follow-up period, showing that it provides an excellent framework for studying the effect of subsequent shocks. It continues by 2 Previous Swedish research on the consequences of displacement has all been based on case studies (e.g., Björklund & Holmlund, 1987; Edin, 1988; Engström & Ohlsson, 1985; Storrie, 1993) . 3 With administrative data, which typically provide both a large reservoir of control observations, upon which to find good matches, and rich pre-displacement information, matching on propensity scores becomes a feasible method for identifying the costs of displacement. To our knowledge, this paper is the first use of matching in the displacement literature. describing how the closed establishments and displaced workers were identified in the data, followed by some descriptive statistics. Section 3 describes the matching technique and motivates its use in this context and Section 4 its empirical implementation in this paper. Section 5 presents the estimates of the impact of job displacement on subsequent labour market status until 1999. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The Swedish labour market and the identification of the displaced workers

The Swedish labour market
The displaced workers were followed over a very long period, i.e., four years before and thirteen years after displacement. As changes in the macroeconomic environment appeared to explain much of the variation in the estimated effect of displacement over time, we briefly outline the state of the labour market during the evaluation period. The initial displacements occurred in 1987 during an exceptionally good period in the Swedish labour market. Unemployment had been falling since 1983 and continued down to a low of 1.5 percent in 1989 and employment rose continually up to a peak in 1990. Indeed, by the end of the 1980s, these two measures indicated a more buoyant labour market than at any time since 1975 (Figure 1 ). However, in the early 1990s, Sweden experienced a macroeconomic downturn unparalleled in the post-war period. GDP fell by six percent from the cyclical peak in the first quarter of 1990 to the trough in the first quarter of 1993. By 1993 unemployment had risen to 8.2 percent. Total employment fell by 13 percent between the first quarters of 1990 and 1994. After 1997 employment rose steadily and by 1999 unemployment had fallen below six percent. Thus, our displaced workers faced a very good labour market for the first four years after displacement with ample time and opportunity to find a new job. Then, at the beginning of the 1990s they faced the most severe recession since the 1930s. From 1997 onwards, there was a sustained recovery.
Identification of the closing establishments and displaced workers
The identification of persons who experienced an establishment closure is a vital and rather unique feature of the data and utilized the possibility in Sweden to link establishment data to employee data. Procedures, developed by Statistics Sweden (Tegsjö, 1995 and Persson, 1999) , are able to trace establishment births and deaths back to 1985 and distinguish establishment closures from mergers and dispersals and other ownership changes. 5 In this paper, all the closures in 1987 and 1988 of establishments with at least ten employees were identified.
A plant closure is a process over time and while the occurrence of a closure could be identified, it was not possible to determine when the process began. To identify a probable duration of the closure processes an upper limit was first set to three years. 6 Then after careful inspection of each closing establishment during the three years prior to closure, the duration of each closure process was defined to be one, two or three years, based on worker flows and establishment size.
7 While this flexible threeyear-window is hardly perfect it is an improvement on previous studies using administrative data that assume that the closing process begins and ends in the same year, or allow for a longer process without examining the individual closure processes (i.e., all closures are defined as being of the same length).
8 Using such rigid time-windows, will presumably either over or under classify the displaced workers depending on the choice of width of the time-window (Kuhn, 2002) .
During the closing process, a separation was identified only by observing whether the worker was employed at the establishment in November in one year but not in the November of the following. Thus, it is not sure that all separations were in fact due to the closure. There are three main possibilities: voluntary quits unrelated to the closure, pre-emptive quits (i.e., quits due to expectation of closure), and actual displacements (i.e., where notice is served on the termination of the employment contact). The last two types of separations can be seen as direct consequences of the closure and should be included in the study. This is an important issue as not only firms' selection of whom to lay off first, but also workers' pre-emptive quits might be based on some unobserved criteria. One could speculate that while those who choose to leave early in the process are those with better labour market prospects, it is just these workers that the firm may wish to retain until the end. Case study evidence in Hamermesh and Pfann (2003) indicated such mechanisms.
Sample retained for analysis
As one of the main issues in this paper is to investigate whether the displaced workers were more severely hit by the deep recession in the early 1990's, the workers in both the study and the control group were required to be employed at the same baseline year. As the control group was comprised of a random sample of 200,000 persons 5 See Appendix A1 for details on these procedures. 6 In Storrie (1993) it was found that the closure process, of a large Swedish shipyard (i.e., a plant with a long period of production), from the public announcement to when the plant was finally closed, was just under three years. 7 The precise ad hoc rules determining the classifications are found in Appendix A2. 8 Bender et al. (2002) applied both a one-year and a two-year-window. employed in November 1986, but not at a closing or downsizing establishment, the study group was restricted to those also employed in 1986, but displaced during the following year. The sample was confined to workers aged between 21 and 50 years in 1987. 11 Those working in the construction sector or a sector not adequately defined were excluded, since for these sectors the concept of establishment may be somewhat peculiar. We also excluded all who were self-employed and required all workers to exist in the registers in each year during the entire observation period (i.e., 1983-99) . This is not as restrictive as it might appear since attrition is, practically, due only to death and emigration. We thereby obtained a balanced panel of 4,397 workers displaced from 371 closing establishments (see Table 1 ) and 115,811 non-displaced workers.
Who are the displaced workers?
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the pre-displacement variables for the displaced workers and the control group of non-displaced workers. The variables listed, together with the variables placed in Appendix A3 to save space here, are those used in the empirical analysis.
12 All variables were measured between 1983 and 1986. However, variables measured in 1986 were not used in cases when they may have been affected by the impending closure. 13 The descriptives show that the displaced workers were slightly younger and more often single than the non-displaced. The displaced had lower earnings than the nondisplaced, and had more often short tenure and previous unemployment experiences. They also had a lower level of education, were less likely to have taxable wealth, but were more prone to have received welfare benefits. We see that the displaced were to a much greater extent employed in the private sector.
14 Perhaps somewhat surprising 9 Note that much of the previous literature typically uses a control group that is never displaced from the firm (e.g., Jacobson et al., 1993) . 10 Thus, no workers displaced during the first year, in a three-year closing process, were included. This is not a serious problem, as very few processes were determined to be three years long, and the corresponding job losers separating were also few. In Eliason and Storrie (2003) , the full three-year-window was used when examining the impact of displacement on mortality. 11 The upper limit keeps our sample of working age (less than 65) for the whole observation period. 12 Details on the data sources are found in Appendix A4. 13 For the displaced workers the establishment variables were as far as possible measured in the year prior to the onset of the closure process. For the non-displaced workers they were measured in 1986. 14 Note that we observe displacement in the public sector, which amounts for roughly 30 percent of employment in Sweden.
there were no regional differences between the two groups as regards local unemployment and employment levels. Finally, the displaced workers were employed at much smaller establishments with a lower educated work force and a higher share of employees born outside the Nordic countries. 
Empirical method
Jacobson et al. (1993) pointed out that the main empirical problem in displacement research is akin to that of the evaluation of labour market policy. One can observe the labour market outcome of the displaced workers, but not the outcome for these workers had they not been displaced. Heckman et al. (1999) provides an overview of various methods to identify the treatment effect. 15 Propensity score matching is one such method. It originated in medical statistics Rubin, 1983, 1984) , but is becoming more prevalent also in Economics (e.g., Heckman et al. 1998a,b; Dehejia & Wahba, 1999 Sianesi 2001a; Lechner, 2002a,b; Larsson, 2003; Smith & Todd, 2004) .
Propensity score matching
By matching one tries ex post to mimic the properties of the randomization of persons into the treatment and non-treatment groups in experimental studies. Intuitively this is a very appealing method, since if the displaced and the non-displaced workers are alike in all relevant pre-displacement characteristics then any difference in subsequent labour market outcome can be attributed to displacement. The major difference between randomization and matching is that randomization "works" for all characteristics, observed as well as unobserved. Matching, on the other hand, only works for the set of observed characteristics (X). Thus, the identification of the treatment effect by matching relies on a conditional independence assumption (CIA), i.e., no variables other than X affect both the assignment to treatment (D) and the potential outcome (Y). 16 To identify the average treatment effect, the CIA is unnecessarily strong. It is sufficient that E[Y|D=1,X] = E[Y|D=0,X] = E [Y|X] . If this mean CIA is valid, the unobserved counterfactual outcome of the treated can be estimated from the observed outcome of the matched non-treated.
Matching directly on only a few covariates is straightforward, but when the number increases, it is extremely unlikely that exact matches will be found. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed, however, that if a function b(X) is a balancing score, i.e., X⊥D|b(X), and if the CIA is valid for X, then the CIA is also valid for b(X). They also showed that the propensity score, defined as p(X)≡Pr(D=1|X)=E [D|X] , is a balancing score. Thus, matching on p(X) corresponds to matching on X, with the advantage that the difficulties of matching on a large set of covariates is eliminated. Smith and Todd (2004) provide an overview of the various methods of matching on propensity scores. The method applied here is a simple nearest-neighbour (one-toone) matching method, combined with a difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator. 17 15 Here treatment is displacement and the terms displaced and treated will be used interchangeable. 16 In mathematical notation: Y 0 ⊥D|X . It is also assumed that P(D=1|X)<1, implying that a match can be found for each treated individual. 17 Examples of studies using difference-in-difference estimators combined with matching are Heckman et al. (1998a,b) and Smith and Todd (2004) .
The matching estimator
With nearest-neighbour matching each displaced worker i is matched to a non-displaced worker j such that
The DiD matching estimator is analogous to the standard regression-adjusted difference-in-difference estimator, but does not impose a functional form on the outcome equation. After the matching procedure the average effect can be estimated by
where t is a period after the displacement and τ is a period before the displacement. The advantage with the DiD matching estimator is that the CIA as stated previously can be relaxed. The identifying assumption is instead,
That the CIA is valid is sufficient, but not necessary, for the validity of this assumption. Even though CIA may not hold we could still identify the effect by the DiD matching estimator if the bias due to a violation of CIA is the same in both the predisplacement period τ and the post displacement period t.
Why propensity score matching, and is CIA valid?
There are two main advantages of propensity score matching, over other nonexperimental evaluation methods. Firstly, the treatment effect can be estimated nonparametrically (i.e., no assumptions on functional form on the outcome equation are required). Secondly, it highlights the common support problem (i.e., the problem of lack in overlap in X or p(X) between the treated and non-treated). 19 It is essential that we are able to convincingly argue that any bias due to selection on unobservables is not an issue in this application (i.e., that the CIA is valid). We argue that, due to the nature of the event of plant closure and the ability to identify early leavers together with the rich information on pre-displacement characteristics, the CIA is indeed a plausible assumption.
A plant closure is not a random event but there are reasons to believe that, compared to, for example, cutbacks in on-going establishments it may greatly reduce the selection problem. All employees at the establishment are displaced irrespective of 18 If pre-displacement values of the outcome variable are included in the conditioning set of X, the identifying assumption is equivalent to the CIA, if the matching is perfect. In this application, predisplacement values of the outcome variables do not enter the set of conditioning variables directly but our measure of unemployment is a linear combination of other variables in the conditioning set. However, we will use this estimator to correct for the impact of any small differences in pre-displacement outcome values, as one never finds fully perfect matches. 19 One major recommendation in Heckman et al. (1999) is that non-experimental comparison groups should be designed so that they have the same set of X or p(X) values as the treatment group. ability, motivation, and other such factors that may be difficult to measure. Let us outline the determinants of plant closures and the characteristics of their employees that we are able to capture.
The structural change driving the closure of establishments is over-represented in certain sectors of the economy. These sectors may in turn have distinctive profiles as regards, for example, region, gender, age, and educational level. Regional conditions such as the local unemployment level and wage level may also have an impact on the survival probability of establishments (Andersson & Vejsiu, 2001 ). Moreover, closing establishments are in general small and new (Harris & Hassaszadeh, 2001; Dunne et al., 1989; Anderson & Vejsiu, 2001) . As can be seen in Tables 3 and C.1 information on conceivably all these factors is available in the data.
The stock of employees at closure is determined by the probability of becoming and remaining employed at the establishment until closure. It is conceivable that there may be systematic job matching between workers who have a low preference for job security or are less risk-averse and establishments with low survival probability (Dunne et al., 1989; Winter-Ebmer, 2001 ). These workers may have a low opportunity cost of displacement, due to for example, a weaker attachment to the labour market or work in a sector with high turnover where not only job destruction but also job creation is high. However, even if the preference for job security is not directly measurable, it is likely that this will be picked up in the employee's previous employment and unemployment history. An indication of lower risk-averseness (and productivity) may also show up in medical history. The data contain information on both the employee's labour market and medical history up to four years prior to the displacement.
However, separations before closure appear to be a more obvious source of unobserved selection. One may have reason to believe that those that remain until the bitter end may either be those who had poorer outside options or showed less initiative in pursuing these options during the closure period compared to those who left earlier.
Moreover, the firm's selection of which workers to displace first in a prolonged closure process is hardly random. It may be very difficult to account for the various processes at work in this situation. As these factors will probably be related to the post-displacement labour market outcome, it is important that we were able to identify also the early separations in the closing process.
Empirical implementation of propensity score matching
The propensity scores were estimated, separately for three age groups (21-30, 31-40, 41-50) , with a logit model with the probability of displacement due to establishment closure as dependent variable. The balancing score property and the CIA imply that it is sufficient to include only covariates that are jointly correlated with the selection into treatment and the outcome. 20, 21 The choice of which interactions and higher-orders terms to include was determined by the need to achieve balance (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) .
The comparison group was constructed by the nearest-neighbour method described above.
22 However, we matched on the logit of the propensity score instead of directly on the propensity score, since matching on the logit should generate better matches when the probability is close to zero or one (Lechner, 2001) . Nearest-neighbour matching can be performed with or without replacement. Allowing each non-treated to be matched more than once can improve matching quality, reducing bias, but it increases variance and especially if the non-treated are frequently used. Here the matching was performed with replacement, but Table 3 shows that most nondisplaced were used only once. To imply balance in X, the theory of propensity score matching outlined above assumes infinite sample sizes and perfect matches on p(X). In practice, perfect matches cannot be expected. The presence of any imbalance in covariates after matching must then be tested. A t-test of equality in means, between the displaced and matched nondisplaced, was performed for each variable included in the estimation of the propensity scores. If any of the tests showed a significant difference, at the 5 percent level, between the two groups, the logit model was re-specified by adding higher-order terms and/or interactions of the variables, and the matching repeated, until balance was obtained.
The effect of displacement in 1987 on subsequent labour market status
After having constructed the control group, of matched non-displaced workers, the DiD estimator, with 1985 as the base year, was applied to estimate the average effect of displacement on subsequent labour market status. Figures 2a-d present the results for employment, measured by paid employment on average at least one hour per week in November, for the three age groups. 23 The results for unemployment, measured as the occurrence of unemployment insurance or benefits in the income registers, is depicted in Figures 3a-d . 24 All estimates are presented with 99 percent confidence intervals. 25 The presentation of the results for employment and unemployment can be divided into four periods: the immediate effect, the recovery, the impact of the recession in the early 1990s, and the long-term effects. 24 We have reason to believe that insured unemployment covers a very large proportion of unemployment as defined by the labour force survey (ILO definition). Between 1988 and 1992, roughly 70 percent of the ILO defined unemployed received benefit (Björklund, 1996) . This is a high figure even in a European perspective (Standing, 2002) . Moreover, a large proportion of those not receiving benefit are those without an employment record, but both the displaced and the matched non-displaced workers were in fact employed in 1986. Note also that this data includes benefit payments for part-time unemployment and for participants in active labour market programmes. 25 The confidence intervals were obtained by (bias-corrected) bootstrapping, which is common practice for one-to-one matching (Smith, 2000) .The whole matching process was replicated (1000 replications) and, in principle, this requires the logit model to be re-specified at each replication, if the covariates are not balanced. In practice, this is too time-consuming. Therefore, it was assumed that the model specification, obtained for the original sample, was appropriate for all replications. The balance was checked in each replication, however, and on average 99% of the covariates were balanced. As an informal test of whether this small imbalance could have had any impact, confidence intervals were also computed using only those replications for which balance was obtained, but the differences were negligible. The immediate effect in 1987, the same year as the displacement, is very clear in terms of both the employment and unemployment gaps between the displaced and the matched non-displaced workers. 26 We observe a total employment gap (Figure 2a ) of just under 8 percent. The displaced workers in the oldest age group exhibited the largest drop in employment, corresponding to a gap of just under 10 percent. The total unemployment gap (Figure 3a) was nearly 12 percent. Both gaps were appreciably lower for the 21-30 year olds.
The recovery can be seen by the considerable narrowing of the total employment and unemployment gaps during 1988 and 1989, even if they were still statistically significant in 1989. The youngest age group made the strongest recovery in terms of employment, as the immediate effect had completely vanished by 1989. The two older age groups recovered up to roughly the same employment levels. However, the oldest group recovered more slowly and it was only by 1990 that the gap became statistically insignificant. As regards unemployment by age group, we note again a total recovery of the youngest, as the gap was statistically insignificant by 1989. For the older two groups there was an even stronger recovery in percentage points, but the gaps were nonetheless significantly different from zero by the end of the recovery period in 1990.
The impact of the recession of the early 1990s is clearly revealed in that the previously observed narrowing of the employment and unemployment gaps ceased abruptly in the early 1990s. Indeed, the total employment gap increased again between 1989 and 1992. The widening of the gap was less pronounced for the 21-30 year olds but very pronounced for the oldest group. The recession of the early 1990s hit the youngest two age groups first, between 1989 and 1990, with a larger initial loss for the 21-30 year olds. When, one year later, the gap widened also for the 41-50 year olds and it widened appreciably. We do not observe as large widening of the unemployment gaps around the time of recession, but the previous trend of convergence between the two groups was arrested. While we could not identify displacement events after 1987, it surely is far-fetched to suggest any other explanation than that the most severe shock in the Swedish labour market in living memory caused higher displacement rates for the previously displaced compared to the matched control group.
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There are significant long-term effects. For the entire period of 13 years, the nondisplaced had a significantly lower rate of employment. The largest long-term employment effects were found for the oldest group, followed by the 31-40 year olds. It was only after the sustained recovery, beginning in 1997 that the total unemployment gap became insignificant, but by the end of the period it seems like the effects have vanished for all three groups.
In summary, we have found that in "good times" displaced workers returns to the same levels of employment and unemployment as non-displaced workers quite quickly, but that they seem to be more vulnerable to subsequent shocks. This increased vulnerability may cause long-lasting effects. We have observed a quite different impact on different age groups. Over the entire period, the most negative employment effects were found for the oldest group and smallest negative effects for the youngest group. The youngest group also experienced an appreciably less impact on unemployment over the period, with the 31-40 year olds exhibiting a slightly stronger impact than the older group. These age differences are similar to the short-term effects found in many countries (Kuhn, 2002) . 
Conclusions
We believe that we have been able to remedy many of the weaknesses of previous research on the consequences of job displacement. This is primarily due to the possibility to link administrative employer and employee data of sufficiently high quality that is now available, at least, in Sweden and some other Scandinavian countries. From these registers, we have identified displaced workers from all establishments 27 The efficient separations literature, see for example McLaughlin (1991) , views the labels of quits and layoffs to be devoid of economic content. A quit occurs when an upward revision of the wage is rejected by the employer and a layoff when a proposed downward revision of the wage is rejected by the worker. In highly unionised country like Sweden, revision of wages to the extent required to accommodate a severe macroeconomic shock does not occur. 28 We note, however, that Jacobson et al. (1993) finds little difference for different age groups on earnings in the long term.
(with more than 10 employees) that closed down in 1987 or 1988 as well as a large random sample of non-displaced workers. We have argued that the possibility to correctly identify all plant closures and the displaced workers (even those leaving before final closure year), and with very extensive pre-displacement information on worker and establishment characteristics, imply that we may reasonably exclude the possibility of selection bias. Our argument on the validity of the conditional independence assumption together with the very large control group makes the use of propensity score matching both valid and feasible.
29 Matching is also a tractable method as it permits estimation without the need of any assumptions on the functional form.
We found lower employment and higher unemployment for the displaced workers in both the short and long run. The initial gaps with the matched control group narrowed appreciably during the following two years. Indeed, by 1989 there was no significant difference in the employment rate for the youngest age group. However, with the advent of severe recession in 1990, the convergence was arrested and the employment rate gap widened again. By the end of our observation period, in 1999, the employment rate of the previously displaced was about 4 percent lower than in the matched control group.
The evidence suggests that the observed initial convergence of employment rates was arrested and then reversed due to the very severe macroeconomic shock that hit the labour market in 1991. The most obvious difference between the two groups by this time was that the previously displaced held relatively new jobs. "New jobs end early" is one of the stylized facts of the job stability literature (Farber, 1999a) . Comparisons of the three age groups provide further support for our short tenure explanation. The difference in tenure between the study and control group, in the early 1990s, is presumably greatest among the older workers and we also found an appreciably more negative labour market outcome for the oldest age group. 30 We cannot precisely specify what short tenure could signify in this context. The most obvious explanation is that it is a measure of job specific capital of value to the firm. It is comprised of firm specific human capital in the original sense of the word (Becker, 1962; Parsons, 1972) , and thus related to tenure. Long tenure may also reveal, through selection, a high quality match, as in the turnover model of Jovanovic (1979) . In the efficient separations literature, (McLaughlin, 1991) displacement occurs when a negative demand or productivity shock is greater than the firm's evaluation of specific job capital and so displacement will be more prevalent among low relative to high tenure employees. This interpretation of the longer-term consequences of displacement is a neat extension of the theory of the shorter-term costs as laid out in Hamermesh (1987) and relates the long-term adjustment process directly to the initial displacement event. The short-run costs are due to the loss of specific capital on the initially displaced job and adjustment takes time due to the exposure of the subsequent short tenure jobs to further adverse shocks.
The Swedish institutional context provides a powerful alternative explanation of the impact of short tenure. Last-in-first-out (LIFO) seniority rules are stipulated in statutory law when displacing labour for economic reasons. However, the firm and the trade unions may negotiate derogations on seniority. While some case studies show that in practice seniority rules are often avoided (e.g., Calleman, 2000) there is no systematic evidence.
Another explanation could be that displaced workers are matched with jobs with a high destruction propensity. Farber (1999b) showed that job losers were more likely than non-job losers to be in temporary employment arrangements. He also provided evidence that this was part of an adjustment process, subsequent to job loss, leading to regular full-time employment.
Regardless of which of these explanations is correct, the vulnerability of recently displaced workers to recurrent displacement provides us with a further conclusion; namely that post-displacement labour market status, even in the longer term, is extremely sensitive to the state of the labour market. This business cycle sensitivity feature should be borne in mind when comparing outcomes in different countries and times. Arulampalam et al. (2001) stated that "a successful macroeconomic framework, with sustained high levels of employment, is the first-best attack on scarring at the aggregate level." Our results suggest, though, that even several years of good macroeconomic conditions are not enough to prevent the scarring effect at the individual level.
Our interpretation of the mechanism behind the longer-term effects of displacement is somewhat different to some of the mechanisms referred to in some of the recent scarring literature (e.g., Arulampalam, 2000 and Gregg, 2001 ). There, it is the experience of unemployment through, for example, deterioration of human capital, or as a signal of low productivity, that is understood to have left a long-term scar.
31
Given the relatively small initial unemployment effects and the rapid recovery found here, this does not appear to be a plausible explanation. The "new jobs end early" explanation is directly related to the initial displacement and may occur with or without an intervening period of unemployment.
The policy implications of these explanations of the long-term consequences of displacement are very different. The stigmatization or the deterioration of general human capital explanations leads one to focus on any policy that may find new jobs for the unemployed. At the micro-level, it implies active labour market policy measures such as matching services or training. As the "new jobs end early" explanation follows from the initial displacement per se the policy options here would appear to be very limited indeed. Few economists would call for a higher level of employment protection. Perhaps the most obvious labour law policy option would be to weaken the LIFO rules. However, this would presumably only shift the burden of subsequent displacement to others. Arulampalam et al. (2000) suggested, however, that employment services focusing more on finding high quality matches rather than quickly finding a new job might be a successful policy option.
Would similar results be found if, data permitting, one were to do this study in other times or institutional settings? The period studied was rather special in that the closures occurred in a very buoyant labour market which soon turned to the most severe recession in living memory. This must be a major factor behind the relatively minor initial effects, the rapid convergence and the negative impact in the longer term. While the sharply contrasting states of the labour market studied in this paper do serve 31 Note also that the employment effects are longer lasting than the unemployment effects.
to highlight the vulnerability of recently displaced to subsequent shocks, it will surely be the case that smaller long-term effects will be found in less turbulent times. Regarding institutions, at first glance the principle of statutory LIFO rules in Sweden may appear to be rather unique. However, as pointed out above, the unions may bargain away the LIFO principle and while there is no systematic evidence of the prevalence of such practices some case study evidence suggests that LIFO rules are often circumvented in Sweden. Moreover, while LIFO rules are seldom the sole criteria in statutory law in other European countries, they are often one such criteria (for example, in Germany) and they are common in collective agreements (Gerard, 2003) . They also constitute a strong social norm in many countries. See Rousseau and Anton (1991) for evidence from the US.
On the other hand, there are several features of our data and research design that may lead to weaker results than in much of the previous research. Gibbons and Katz (1991) argued and presented empirical evidence for a better labour market outcome for workers displaced by plant closures compared to cutbacks in ongoing establishments, due to the negative signal of being selected for displacement. While some other US evidence does not support this result, recent evidence from Norway, (Huttunen et al. 2003) does. Moreover, administrative data will always capture some separations that are not displacements, though presumably our exclusive focus on closures is helpful in this respect. Note also that the non-displaced workers in the control group may have been displaced at any time after 1988 and presumable some of them were subsequently also displaced, especially since we have conditioned on establishment characteristics. The displaced workers were not constrained to long tenured workers either, i.e., those who would be expected to be the main losers of displacement. Finally, we studied displacement in all sectors of the economy unlike much of the previous research that has been confined to the private sector and often only manufacturing.
Appendix A. Identification of establishment closures
Statistics Swedens Business Register (Företagsdatabasen) is the basic frame for identification of establishments in both the private and public sectors. The first step in determining whether an establishment has closed is to find non-matches between the establishment identity number in the Business Register and the obligatory annual payroll tax returns, which are submitted by establishment. However, non-matches are only potential closures as they may occur due to a change in the identity number due to, for example, a change in legal status of the firm, change in ownership, or simply due to errors. An incorrect change in the identity number has occurred if any two of the following criteria apply: 1) it has the same owner; 2) it has the same geographical location; 3) it conducts the same type of economic activity. To assure that this is not the case, Statistics Sweden surveys the firms when non-matches occur in multiestablishment firms or in establishments of at least 10 employees (as is the case in this study).
Appendix B. Definition of the length of the closure process
The definition of the length of the closure process was based on the size of the establishment and its worker flows. The investigation of the worker flows is possible by the linking of employees to their establishment in the Register Based Labour Market Statistics (Registerbaserad arbetsmarknadsstatistik). This linkage is feasible because of the obligatory income statements, filed to the taxation authorities by the employer, which contain both the employee's civic registration number and the establishment's identity number. The precise definitions of the length of the closure process are given below.
Definition 1.
For an establishment closed in year t the closing process was 3 years if a) the number of employees in t-3 was 50 or more, and b) there was a reduction of the workforce, between both t-3 and t-2, and between t-2 and t-1, of at least 20 percent.
Definition 2. For an establishment closed in year t the closing process was 2 years if a) the closing process was not 3 years according to Definition 1, b) the number of employees in t-2 was 25 or more, c) there was a reduction of the workforce, between t-2 and t-1, by at least 10 employees, and d) the reduction corresponded to at least 20 percent of the workforce.
Definition 3. For an establishment closed in year t the closing process was 1 year if the closing process was not 2 or 3 years according to Definitions 1 and 2. 
Appendix D. Data sources
The pre-displacement variables included in the matching process, given in Tables 2  and C1 , and the outcome variables, defined in the main text, were collected from four principal registers. Taxation and the administration of the universal Swedish welfare state provide the basis for practically all the variables, and the registers cover every individual and every firm in the country. The principal registers, The Register Based Labour Market Statistics, The Income and Wealth Register (Inkomst-och förmögen-hetsstatistiken), The Longitudinal Register of Education and Labour Market Statistics (LOUISE), and The Hospital Discharge Register (Patientregistret), are created by compiling data from several other registers. 32 A brief account of the original data sources for the variables in this paper is given below.
The Population and Housing Censuses (Registret över totalbefolkningen) contains basic demographic information on age, sex, marital status, number and age of children, and country of birth. The county of residence is also contained in this register and we used a regional classification of counties (based on demography, urbanisation and employment structure) as defined by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities for 1985.
All data pertaining to income, labour market status and wealth is compiled in The Income and Wealth Register. This register is based on tax returns and income statements (kontrolluppgifter). Employers are obliged to file annual income statements, for each employee, which are used by the taxation authorities for individual income taxation. Moreover, since practically all transfers in the Swedish welfare state, such as disability pensions, and sickness and unemployment benefits, are liable to tax the National Social Insurance Board also files income statements on such transfers. The outcome variable "employment" was also derived from this source by Statistics Sweden by examining the income statement pertaining to November. Although, social assistance is not liable to tax this information is gathered from a separate register, the Social Assistance Register (Registret över ekonomiskt bistånd), and included in the Income and Wealth register.
33
The data on education are from The Register of Educational Attainment of the Population (Registret över befolkningens utbildning), which draws its information from several sources. These include the Population and Housing Censuses, the Higher Education Register (Högskoleregistret), the National Labour Market Board (AMS), and the National Board of Student Aid (CSN), and are updated annually.
The health data were extracted from two sources. The number of insured sickness days was taken from registers supplied by the National Social Insurance Board (RFV). In addition, the number of hospital inpatient days is from The Hospital Discharge Register to which we have had full access. The County Councils are required to report all completed hospital inpatient stays (including date of admission and discharge, diagnosis, surgical procedures, etc) to the Epidemiological Centre at the National Board of Health and Welfare that compile the register.
The regional labour market data was made available to us by The Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU). 34 The regional income and employment data is a regional aggregation of the individual based taxable income data. The regional unemployment data is based on registered unemployment from the local labour market authorities.
The size of the establishments, the industrial classification and the variables on work force composition by sex, education, and national background were taken from The Register Based Labour Market Statistics, i.e., the same register that was used to identify the displaced workers.
